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This thesis, dealing with the above
mentioned elements, tests and proofs of a·
general partnership, the author will en 
deavor to show the relation of these com
ponent elements in the formation of su c h
partnerships .

1:

Partnership inter see
a. Elements.
In regard to the requisites of a partnership, the
rule has often been quoted as being that such requisites
are that the parties must have joined together to carry
on a trade or adventure for their COY([rUon benefit, eclch
contriiJuting property or services and having a communi
ty of interest in the pr o fits.

(145 U. S. 611). In

California, the Civil Code at Section 2395 states that
lIa partner:::h i p is the association of two or more
persons, for the purpose of carrying on business
together, and dividing its profits between themn.
How far the sharing in profits of an organization will
make one a partner has been a subject of much discussion ,
and.. the modern doctrine seems to be that the

simple

sharing of profits is not sufficient to make one a
partner .

For instance, merely receiving compensation

for services or labor, estbnated cy a certain propor 
tion of the profits does not render one liable as a
partner .

He must share in those profits as a principal .

(LoOlnis V. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69 .)

Likewi o; e, where

one has 10a.'rJ.ed money to an enterprise, and who is to
receive a

ce~tain

percentae e of the profits in addi

tion to a stipulated amount of interest, does not
necessarily make him a partner in that business. So
it seems that in the requisites as cited above that there
is one very important element lacking~ As stated by mod
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ern. authorities, in order to have a true partnership, the
relation of principal a !:1d agent must exist .

The partner

embraces the character both of principal and a g ent. So
faY- as he acts for himself and his ovrn interest in the
common concerns of the partnership, he may be deemed a
principal, and so far as he acts f or his partner, he may
be deemed an a s ent.

The principal distinction between him

a n d a mere a,,:,;ent is that he has a community of interest wI th
t h e other partners in the whole property, business and
responsibilities of the partnership, whereas a simple agent'
has n o such interest.
Justice sto~J in a sQmmary in his Comment ar ies on
Partnership concludes that tla participation in the profits
will ordinarily establish the existence of a partnership
betwe en the p a rties in favor of third per sons, in the ab 
sence of all other opposing circumstances ft

,

but that it

is not to be regarded as an y thing more than me re presump 
tive proof thereof, and therefore liable to be repelled
and ove rc ome by other circumstances, and not as of itself
overcoming or repelling themtl,and that therefore if t he
participation in the profits can already be shovm to be
in the charact e r of agent, then the presumption of a
partnership is repelled.
And so it has been held that an a gent or servant, whose
compensation is measured by a certain p roportion of the
profits of the partnership bUSiness, is not thereby made a
p artner.

(Perrine V. Haukinson, 11 N. J. L. 215.) And

likewise an agreement whereby the l essor of a hotel
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shall receive a certain portion of the profits by way
of rent, does not make him a partner with the lessee.
( Beecher & Bush, 45 Mich. 188. )
It is now equally as well settled that the receiving
of paI't of the profits of a comme r cial enterprise in lieu
of or in addition to interest, by way of compensation for
a loan of money does not make the lendor a partner . From
the decisions of all cases cited, theI'e Hill.St be the rela
tion of principal and agent, w.here e a ch partner i sootLl
pr incipal

~~d

agent.

2: Partnership the
a. Le gal

res ~ lt

of intention.

intention controls.

b. Partnership by operation of law.
Another element which enters into the formation of
a partnership is the intent of the parties.

Persons can

not be made to assume the relation of partners as between
themsel ves, vvhen. their purpose is that no partnership shall
exist.

rrhere is no reason why they may not enter into an

agreement whereby one of t hera shall participate in the
profits arising in the

management of part i cular property

without his becoming a partner with t h e others.

Such

was held in the case of London As surance Co. vs . Drennan,
116 U. S. 461 . And so in 20 Cal. Juris at; page 461 it is
held that an intention to form a partnership is necessary
as between the parties t h emselves, but not as

be tween

them and third parties.
As t o those who have had dealings with the alleged
partners, the question as to the existence of a partner 
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ship is to be determined with a view to the facts as
were knovvn to them, unaffected by ary secret agreement
. between the persons who are sought to be held liable
as partners.
The intent of the parties does

not necessarily

depend on their intentions but whether legally there was
an intent.

It is possible for parties to intend no

partnership and yet form one.
ment which is a

If they agree on an arrange

partnership in fact, it is of no import

a n ce that they call it something else, or that they are
not partners.

The law must de c lare what is the legal

import of their a g reements, and names go for nothing
when the substance of the arrangement show' them to be
inapplicable. (Busher vs. Bush, 40 Am. Rep. 465.)
Mr . Bates, in 17 American and English Encyclopedia
of Law, 828, gives the following definition of a partner 
ship: !fA partnership is the contract relation subsisting
between persons who have combined their labor, property
and skill in an enterprise or business as principals for
the purpose of jOint profit.

In addition he states till t

although a partnership is called a contract, it is the
result of a contract, the relations which subsist between
persons who have a g reed to share the profits of some
bus iness, rather than the agreement to share such profits .
Hence, it is not essential to the existence of a partner 
ship that i t be so denominated in the contract of the
parties, nor is it necessarily fatal thereto if the parties

- 5 
declare in such contract that they do not intend to be
partners.

The real inquiry is, have the parties by their

contract combined their property, labor

01'

skill in an

enterprise or business , as p rincipals for the purpose of
joint profit?

If they have done so, they are partners in

that enterprise or business, no ma'lter how earnestly they
may protest they are not, or how far distant the forma
tion of a partnership vvas fro m their mi nds.

The terms of

their contract given, the la'l"1 ste p s in and declares what
their relations a r e to t h e enterprise or

cusines~,

a!ld to

each other. (Sp aulding VS. Stubbins, 39 fun. St. Rep. 888).
In the case of Chapman vs. Hughes: 104 Cal. 302, three
me n created an association for the purpose of c a rrying on
to ge ther the busine8s of selling lands, and dividing the
profits between them.

They contemplated united action i n

advertising and dherwise in promoting sales and a jOint
expense to be incurred thereby, and further expressly
provided fO l' the payment to

-:~ he

syndicate o f commissions

on sales of other lands than those put into the syndicate.
Tl1 is Vias sufficient to constitute the relationsl'lip of
partnership.

~fueth er

the parties knew that they were

partners or not, they certainly intended and contracted
to do all that in law is necessary to create a partner ship.
Th e relation of partnership may be estacllsned although
the parties may not expre s sly intend to cre a te such
relationship.
In the case of Farnwn vs. Patch, 49 Am. Rep . 313 ,
a number of unincorll orated persons taking nmnDers of
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"shares" tlfor the purpose of st a rting a grocery store tf
are partners between themselves, although they called
themselves "stockholders" and their opinion -was that
there was no liability for losses beyond the amount
paid for the shares.

The reason for the holding was

that the organization resembled a partnership in every
manner.

The profits were not to be set aside and kept

as a separ a t e fund with a preserved

ide ~ tity,

but they

were to be mingl ed with and become part of the lIstock
holders'!! capital .

The stockholders were to be joint

prlilcipals c arrying on the buSiness, and they were to
share in the profits alike .

The result i.s that such

principals are partner s .
Thus the intent of the parties se ems to be the
necessary element in a partnership.

This intent which

is deemed essential is an intent to do those things
which constitute a partnership.
intent exists,

no~withstanding

Hence, if such an
that they did not pur

pose the liabilit y attaching to partners,

or even ex

pressly stipulated in their agreement that they were not
to be partners.

It is the substance and not the name

of the 8Y'rangement between them which determines t hei r
legal relation toward each other.

3:

I

Tests o f intention .
a. Profit sharing.
b. Intention .
c. Sharing of losses .
d . Niutu:.J l Agency .
e. Comrnon ovmership of property .
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The tests of this intent vary considerably, but
the foremost are the test of profit sharing, sharing
of losses, intention to form a partnership, mut ual
agency, and cOlwnunity of interest .
~he

first test, the test of profit sharing which

was recognized by &'11er1can courts came to us through the
case of Waugh vs. Carver, an English case .

From this

case, the e a rly kmerican courts established the rule
that if a person partakes of the profits of any branch
or trade or bum ness, he is answeraole as a partner' for
his losses .

The reason for this wa s that if he took a

part of the profits, he took from the creditors a part
of the

fQ~d

which was t ll e proper security for the pay

ment of his deb t s.

,The onl y quallfication which they

had to the rule was when a pex'son stipula t ed to receive
a sum of money in proportion to a g iven quantity of the
profits as a reward for his services, he was not charg e 
able as a partner .
Respective states d i f fer on t h e question, many states
still holding to this doctrine, but other following the
modified doctr i ne a s laye ci down in Cox vs . HiclrrtlaIl.

In

t:':lis case wa s where two :ne rchants and copartners becoming
embarrassed in their circumstances, assigned all thei r
property to truste e s, e mp owerine; them to carryon the
busine ss, and to divide the net income ratably among
their creditors, a nd to pay any residue to the debtors,
the majority of the creditors being authorized to make
rules for conducting the business or to put an end to

~----

----

-

-- -

-

-- - -

- - - - - - --

--

- 8 

it altogether.

The House of

Lords held that the

creditors were not liable as partners for debts in
curred by the trustees in carrying on the business
under the assignment.

The decision was put upon the

g round that the liability of one partner for the acts
of his copart21er is i n truth the lia LJility of a principle
for t he acts of his agent; that a right to participate
in the profits, though cogent is not conclusive

evidence

t}i...at the busine ss is carr ied on or in part .-I:'or the pe-c'son
receiving them, and that the test of his ability as a
partner is whether h e has authorized the managers of a
business to carry it on in his behalf.

The creditors in

this case proved that the bus iuess was only being run
until such time as the business affairs could be wound
up,

and the managers only had

business to such ends.

~) ower

to carryon the

Th : creditors were not held to

be partners i n t he firm.
Possibly the leading case in opposition to

the net

profit test is the case of Eastman vs. Clark, 53 N. H.276.
This case holds that Vtfaugher vs. Carver is based on a
false asstLllption, namely, that a man who takes part of
the profits, tak es part of that fund on which the creditor
of the trader relies for his payment.

The fallacy lies

in that creditors cannot, nor do rely on net profit for
pa;VTflent.
paid.

Net profits do not exist until creditors are

The fact that net prof its are realized, presupposes

that the creditors of the firm are satisfied, or that the
partnership assets are sufficient to satisfy their claims.
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A sound argument in favor of

th~

net profit test

is that if one stipulates for an interest i n t h e profits
of a business which would

g ive him a specific lien or

a ' :preference in payment over other creditors, giving him
the full benefit of the increased p rofits without any
cO l 'responding risk in case of l oss , it would operate un
justly as to other creditors.

This is d isposed

of by

]Vlr . Story as follows: "The creditors to whom he is
preferred are onl y .the separate creditors of the actual
partner; he has

~o

preference over t he creditors, for

there are no profits u ntil they are p aid, and it is only
out

O j~

t h e profit s that his remuneration is to come.

And though a partner is entitled to an account, yet a
p erson may b e entitled to an account and still not
be a partner.

If he is to share a sum equal to a share

of the p rofits, by the great weight of' aut hori t y , cle a rl y
n o partner, yet how can he secure

t h e payment of the

compen s ation agreed upon unless h e ha s an account?
A third argument is t hat t h e shar er of the net profits
will otherwi s e receive usurious interest without risk .
But usury is punishable by law, and it is not customary
to punish usury by comp elling par ties to per form contracts
whi ch they n ever made,
A fourt h arg;ument is t hat the net profit rule is
necess ary to p rotect third per sons against the frauds
which mi ght be practiced if secret agreeme n ts were allowed
to be binding on third p ersons .

It is conceded by

-------

-

-

---

-
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the supporters of this d octrine that so far as this agree 
ment is known it is to be binding on all who have knowledge
of it.

It is also conceded b y the o pp osition as in the

case of' Eastman vs. Clark, that although it is nearly
impossible for one to 5 ain access to the net profits, that
if perchance h e should obtain a part of the gross returns,
he must of course refund them if needed to pay debts; for
his own a g reement does not authorize hiIll to receive any
dividend until all the debts are

paid.

The argument that one who shares in the profits might
not bear his burden of t he losses as a rallacy. If

he

has

paid nothing for his right , there is no consideration, and
the r'e fore we must presume that h e :pays something, and does
bear a burden in that he runs t he risk of losing what
he puts in.

His claim is not enforceable until all the

creditors of the firm are satisfied.

Also, it is held

that an agreement to share profits without being liable for
its debts is not in its nature against the policy of the law.
It seems to follow t h at tho ugh the profit sharing test
is evide n ce of a partnership, it is only that and nothipg
more.
The second test or the test of intention,seems
much more controlling than the former.

'This wa s

i n both Beecher vs . Bush and Eastman vs. Clark.
sion in Beecher vs. Bush

W8.S

that the test

01'

to be

follo wed
The conclu

partnership

mus t be found i n the in tent of t he partie s the'msel ve s. They
may say the y intend mane when their contract plainly shows
t h e contrary and in that case the intent shall control the

- - -- - - - -
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contradictory statement.

In this case, there was no

agen cy of eith er to a ct for t h e other or for bot n , no
particip ation of profits, no sharing of
corrunon p roperty.

l ~ sses,

and no

They intended no partnership, and the re

can be n o such t h 1ng as a p art n ers h 1 p as to th1rd persons
wh en a s bet V'f een t h e p arties t h e :mselves there is no partner
ship, a n d t h e third persons h ave not been m1sl e d by con
ceaLnent o f facts or by d ec ep ti ve appe ar ance s.
The case of Yatsuyana j i v s. Shimam:n1s, 5 9 Wash 24 h eld
that: !f The essential test in determining the existence
of a p art -ne rship is whether the l=B- rti e s 1ntended to estab
lis ri such a relation, and as bet we en themselves t h e 1nten
tioD must be d etermined by t h eir express a greeme n t or
1nferred f rom t h eir

acts ~

Pa rticipation 1n the p ro f its of

a busine ss 1s a mere circumstance to show the relation
betwee n p ersons tak ing the p rofits a n d those carrying on
the business, t h e test of partnership between t h e p a rt1es
being a que s ti on of' actua l intent, either exp re s sed in
t h e contract or imp l i ed fro m the acts of the p arties and
the circumstances surrounding their relationshi p . (Roach
vs. Rector. 9 3 Ark. 521.
Where there is no proof of actual agree ment, the rule
of sharing profits raising a presump tion of partnership
is applicable.

But where there is such an a g reement, the

question o f p artnershi p mus t be det e r rl1ined from it. The
court will look to the entire transaction in order to find
t h e intention of the p arties, and this intention when
discovered will determine the e x istence or non-existence of
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the alleged p artnership. (In re Hirth 1 89 Fed. 926.)
The third test, the test of sharing losses, is
always coup le d. with t he sharing of p rofits.

It is the

presump tion that where Oile shares p rofits he will also
share losses, but this is not conclusive.

As has been

formerly stated, one may share profits without losses,
but when the two are done to ge ther, it is strong evidence
of a partne rship.
It has been sometimes held that the sharing of gross
returns ma k es the p articipants p artners, and seems more
feasable than the net p rofit te st, in that if in the
latter case, the one who shares in t he net profits, takes
from t he cr e ditors p art of the fund on which they rely .
for p ayment, much more d oes he who shar es in g ross returns.
But the rule is and has been tha t an a g reement to share
g ross returns, does not create a p a r tnership.

The Uniform

Partnership Act p rovides; liThe recei p t of gross returm
does not of itself

establish a partnership, whether or not

t h e persons s h aring theri1 have a joint or corrnnon right or
any interest in the p roperty from which the profits are
derived. 1/
The next and
mutual a gency

te s t.

probably most imp cbrtant test is the
The for::'B.ation of a partnership makes

the me::nbers thereof mutual a gents in the con duct of the
:partnershl:9 business, and in many cases this mutual agency
is

r~de

the test to determine the existe n ce of a partnership.

Cox vs. h ickman seems to hold that one should not be
held liable as a dormant or sleeping partner where the trade
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might not be fairly sai d to have been caI'rie d on for him,
and when, therefore, he 'would stand in the relation of
principal toward the ostensible members of the firm as his
agent s, Lord Wensleydale says,

II

A man who allows another to

carryon trade, whether in his own na.'11e or not to buy and
sell, and to pay over all the profits to him, is undoubtedly
the principal, ancl the person

3;0

employed is his agent, and

the principal is lis. ble for the agent's contracts in the course
of his employment.

So if two or more agree that they should ,

carryon a trade, and share the profits of it, each is a
principal, and e a ch is a n ,agent for the other, and each is
bound by the other's contract in carrying on the trade,
as much as a single principal would be by the act of an
agent who is to give all of the profits to the Employer.

II

Therefore, on principle the true test of a partnership at
last, is left to be that of the relation of the parties as
principal a n d agent. ( Harvey vs . Childs', 22 Am. Rep 387.)
,but even though mutual agency may be a useful

test in

many instances, .it is not strictly log ical nor entirely
satisfactory, and it has been pointed out tha t

the agency

results from the partnership and not the partnership from
the agency .

In other words, agency is one of the atflributes

of a partnership.
It makes no difference what

arrangements have been l'n ade

betwee n the r:arties for conducting their business, for as
between themselves, if no partnership were intended, then
there is none as between themselves .

So it is held that

whether a party who furnishes money to another under an

------

- -- -- --

-

-

-

-- --

------
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agreement where he shall receive instead of interest,
half the profits of the business whi ch the other con 
ducts, as a

r:a rtner

in the business or whether he

merely loaned the money

depends on the intention of the

parties. ( Wi lloughby vs. Hildredth, 182 Mo. App. 80.)
That intention does not necessarily refer to the conscious
working of the mind, butto the

legal intention which the

law deduces from the acts of the parties, and, if they
intend to do a thing which in law constitutes a partner 
ship, they are partners thou gh their purpose was to avoid
the creation of such a relation. (Breinig vs. Sparr ow,

39 Ind. Ap p . 455.)
All the facts surrounding the transactio n must be
tak en into considerat ion.

Among these facts is whether or

not the alleged partner acquired by the contract any
property in or control over, or specific lien to the
profits before their division, in preference to other
creditors.

The intent of a partnership relation in res pect

to partnership liability to

thi ~u

persons is determined by

the contract as a whole considered together with the conduct
of the parties to the contract and dealings

8.S

to the world.

(Westcott vs. Gilman, 150 Pac. 777.)
Still ru10ther test of intention see ms to ue the common
ownership of property.

But it has been held in the cases

of Butler Savings Bank vs. Osborne, 159 Pa. 10, and Noyes vs.
Cusrmlan, 25 vt. 320 , that tenants in common engaged in the
development or improvement of the connnon property will be

- 15 presUY.~ed

in the absence of proof of a contract of

partner

ship, to hold the same relation to each other during such
improvement or development as before it began.

As to third

persons, they may subject themselve s to liability as par t
ners by a course of dealing, or by their acts and deduc 
t

tions, but as to each other

their relation depends on their

title, until by an agree'iJ ent with each other they change it.
'1'he English rule which the American Courts have followed
is that when tenants in common agree to carryon mining
operations upon their land each contributing to the expenses
in proportion to his respective interest in the land, they
will be considered, both to themselves and third person.s as
the ordinary owners of land, working their

respective shares,

subjec t to no lmvs of partnership whatever.
A mere community of interest in real or personal est8te
does not constitute a partnership.

But where a purchase of

that c h aracter is made, and the premises are rebuilt or
repaired for the p urpose of prosecuting some joint enterprise
or adventure, and under an agreement to share in

the profits

and losses of the undel"taking, the contract then becomes one
constituting alpartnership, and each member is liable thereof
as a partner, and they are liable jointly for services per 
formed in perfec tine; their j oint undertaking. (N'oyes vs.
Cuslxman, 25 vt. 390.)
Swmning up the various and conflicting decisions upon
the test of partnership, _l.t is safe to say that

insofl:n~

as

any actual partnership is concerned, intention is the usual
test, that is, as between the partners themselves. As regards
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partnership liability to thind persons, there is a
considerable diverstty of opinion.

The test usually

applied is the sharing of profits and losses together
with the mutual a g ency doctrine.

There is, howe ver, a

tendency of the American courts to look to the so-called
tests more as presumptive than conclusive tests, and to
take all the matter of the transaction into c onsideration
in arriving at a decision.

4:

Joint Enterprise or Business.
a. Distinguished from partnership.
It is not nec essar y that there shoul c1 be a s e ries of
transaction s nor that the relation ship b etwee n t he parties
shoul d continue a long time to con stitute a partnership. It
~ ay

exist for a single venture or undertaking . (Jones vs.

Davies, 72 Am. St. Rep. 354.)
persons joiEed together and
of sale and p rofit only.

T his

was a case where three

l-JUl~chased

The

pr opert ~

the narae of one of the par ties.

land for the .purpose
w~s

prirchased in

It was held that it is im

mat e rial in whose name the purchase is made, or the title
tak e n , as in such case the property is to be deemed to be
IB- rtne r ship pro Derty , and the par ties are entitled t o the

rights and subject to the liabilities of partners.
added fact in th

An

case vras that the p arties were engaged in

this single transaction only, and it was held that a
partner'ship might exist for a single .venture, or single
venture, or sing le transaction such as the purchase of
land for speculation.
A transaction such as the latter is sometimes termed
a jOint adventure, and althoug4 it is also k nowl1 as a
-------

--
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partnership, still there is a difference in the meaning
of the terms.

A partnership is formed for transacting

a general business of some ki n d, while a joint adventure
is formed for a single transaction.
5: Partnership by estoppel.
It seems unnecessary to speak of estoppel

8.S

a test of

partnership, as the very meaning of the word raised the
implication that the acts of the party estopped, prevent
him from setting up the real facts of no such relation. It is
based un on the principle that if a person holds himself out
either actively or passib1y, or permits himself to be held out
as a member of a partnership, and so, perhaps, induces third
parties to deal with the firm and extend credit upon the
belief' that the party estopped was a member thereof, and
upon the credit of this party, when otherwise they would not
have so dealt, he should not t hen be allowed to·deny his
apparent connection with the partnership and to escape the
liability to the detriment of the creditors who relied upon
his acts or representations. (Morris VB. Brosn, 177 Ala. 389.)·
lJVhen

8.

holding out as partners has once been established,

the parties are liable to one induced thereby to give credit.
The ground of such liability is not upon the direct rep
resentations betwe en the parties, to prevent fraud.

The

onl:)r means b y "'ihlcn pers ons between "whom there is no
actual partnership can b e held liable as partners is by
making out a case of estoppel against them, and all the
elements of estoppel must be proved .

- 18 
In order to hodl one a me:mber of a partnership by
estoppe l, it must appear that the person dealing with the
firm believed, and had a

reason~ iJ le

ri [ ht to believe, that

the party he seeks to hold as a partner 'was a member of
the firm, and that credit was to some extent induced by
this belief, and it must also appear that the holding out
W 8. S

by the party sought to be charged, or by his authority

or with his knowled;;e or assent .

This

where it is

not

the direct act of the party, may be inferrea from tne cir
cumstances, such as fro!!l advertisements, shop-bills, signs,
or cards, or from various oth er acts, from which it is
reasonabl y inferred that the holding out was with his
authority, knowled '; e or assent, and whether a party has
so held himself out is i n every case a question of fact
and not of law.
It vms also held that a ' jury may infer that a person
was held out to the public as partner with knowledge and
consent fro m the fact that he kne w that his name was
signed with that of dher persons to an advert isement
calling attention to their business and soliciting f rom
t h e public a continuance of confidence and business, and
did {,ot insert in a newspaper in which such advertisernents
were published any denial of the partnership, and evidence
of this fact is a&aissable though the party dealing with
the SUP:90sed firm never' saw the advertisements, where it
has bee n shown that h e had trusted the firm in good faith
and upon g ood grounds . (Fletc herPullen. 1 4 Am.. St . Rep.355.)

-

- - - - - - - - - --
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6:

Existence of a Partnership.
a. Nature of Question .
b. Burden of Proof.
After enu:.rnerating

the vEl.rious elements and tests of

a partnership, we have arrived at the final analysis,
namely, the burde n of proof under certain conditions and
relations.
Generally speaking, the burden of proving a partner
ship a par tnership is on the plaintiff.

The law never

presumes the existe::lce of a partnership, but requires
those v/ho assert its existen ce, especially as betwee n
themselves, to prove such e x ist e nce by the clearest and
most positive evidence.

(Chapin vs . Cherry. 147 S.W.I084.)

\i1Jhere a plaintiff declared again st a defendant individually
but sought to charge hiIn as

a partner, the burden was

held to be on the plaintiff to show the partne rs hip, but
is is held that vvh en the evidence prima facie establishes
a partnership, or when it is suc h that a partnership may
reasonabl y be

in~erred,

the burden is cast upon the

defendant to show an incorporation where it was sou.ght
to avoid individual liability, on the ground that the
comp-any was incorporated.

(Henshaw vs. Root, 60 Inc.220.)

W]j.ere the action is between partners as for accounting
o r dissolution, the burden is on the

plain~irf

to prove

the existence of a partnership .
Courts recognize the fact that no absolute rule can
be given either as to t h e amount or kind of proof suffi c ient
to establish the relation of partnership among the persons
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sought to be charged.

It is apparent that the proof

must be sufficient to bring the parties within the
comprehension of the definitions previ ously given .
That is, the evic.ence must be sufficient to show some
arrangement or agreement between the persons sought to
be charged as partners, to contribute money, goods, skill
or labor to some business or enterprise, to the end that
the profits der'ived therefrom may be divided between them;
or generally an 8.greement to the effect that they sll.are in
the profits and losses .

It has also been shown sufi'iciellt

in r espect to third parties, to prove that O·'le of the
persons sought to be charged, shall have permitted the
others to use his creditor to hold him out as jointly
liable with themselves .
To establish the fact of partnership between them
selves much stricter proof is necemary than in cases
be t ween partners and third persons.

The reason for this

is that it is within the powers of the partners to give
evidence on the subject of the partnership than a third
person could ordinarily produce. (Walker vs. !Viathews,
58 Ill. 196.)

The question as to what constitutes a partnership is
one of law, but whether or not one exists is a question
of fact to be determined by the evidence surrounding the
case .

